


















This paper analyses the factors determining reservation wages in Estonia, and estimates 
the influence of the reservation wage on unemployment duration. According to 
estimations there is no statistically significant effect of unemployment benefit and social 
assistance on the reservation wage in Estonia. While evidence was found, that the higher 
the reservation wage, the lower the probability of finding a job, if all other things are 
equal. It was also found that the eligibility of unemployment benefit or social assistance 
increases the duration of the unemployment period, which indicates the lower offer 
arrival rate in the case of unemployed receiving assistance, which might be caused by a 
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In 2001 about 83 thousand people in Estonia were unemployed, which is 12.7 per cent of the 
labour force. Of those unemployed 48 per cent had been unemployed for more than a year, 
which suggests that a large share of unemployment in Estonia is structural. (The issues 
concerning structural unemployment in Estonia have been thoroughly studied, for example, 
by Eamets et al, 2000; Venesaar et al, 2001). Generally, the role of labour market institutions 
influencing labour market outcomes in Estonia is considered rather minimal (Eamets, 2002; 
Freytag, 2002). Still, recent research on social benefits (Kuddo et al, 2002) has suggested that 
some people might accept the high minimum wage and social benefit as an incentive to be 
voluntarily unemployed. This leads to the need to study reservation wages in Estonia.  
 
The reservation wage is the lowest wage an unemployed person would accept. The 
reservation wage is a factor determining the length of an unemployment period. The 
reservation wage depends on the possibility of receiving a wage offer (which depends on the 
situation in the labour market and the person’s qualifications and education) and on the 
workers ‘outside option’ – their unemployment benefit and personal savings or wealth.  
 
In the current paper the idea is to analyse the factors effecting reservation wages in Estonia, 
as well as estimate the influence of the reservation wage on unemployment duration. The 
factors analysed for their effect on the reservation wage include social assistance and 
unemployment benefit. The analysis should help to answer the question of whether any 
voluntary unemployment exists in Estonia. The main hypothesis of the paper is that high 
reservation wages lead to longer unemployment periods and reservation wages are increased 
by social benefit.  
 
Information about reservation wages in Estonia has been obtained from the Labour Force 
Survey, which has already been conducted since 1995. Still, to the author’s knowledge, the 
topic of the reservation wage has not been addressed in Estonia before. The paper uses data 
from individual unemployed job searchers from the period 1997–2000 to model a 
determination of the reservation wage and duration of unemployment. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 provides the theoretical framework used to 
understand the reservation wage in the context of job search decisions. Section 2 introduces 
the empirical model used to make the estimations in the paper. Section 3 describes the data 
used in the study. In section 4 the results of the estimation are presented.  
 
1. The Theoretical Concept of Reservation Wages 
 
The reservation wage is considered the minimum wage an unemployed person is willing to 
accept when looking for a job. Reservation wages can be discussed within the framework of 
a search model based on, for example, Layard et al (1991).  
 
Unemployed person i searches for a job with a wage higher or equal to his/her reservation 
wage ) (
R
i W . There is a certain probability of the unemployed person receiving a suitable 
wage offer higher than his/her reservation wage ( ) ) (
R
i i W W p > , which is determined by the  
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base arrival rate of offers, the unemployed person’s search effort and the chances of being 
accepted when the person applies. The base arrival rate is influenced by the general situation 
in the labour market (characterised, for example, by the regional unemployment rate). The 
unemployed person’s characteristics such as skills, age and education, determine the 
probability of being accepted. The general situation, the job search effort as well as the 
probability of being accepted for a job, may vary with time. The unemployed person might 
decrease his/her search effort if the spell of unemployment increases (discouraged people, 
have lost the hope of finding a job). While he/she might increase the search effort, when 
his/her eligibility for unemployment benefit ends. The probability of being accepted for a job 
may decrease as a result of a lengthening unemployment period, as employers might take a 
long-term unemployment spell as a negative sign of the worker’s qualification and effort. 
 
Wage offers have a distribution specific to each individual, depending on their personal 
characteristics (the person’s qualifications) as well as the general labour market situation. 
While the general labour market situation changes, the distribution may also change in time 
and may be effected by the length of the unemployment period. The human capital of the 
unemployed person may depreciate and the employer’s perception of the person’s 
qualifications may decrease as a result of a lengthening unemployment spell. Throughout the 
duration of the unemployment spell the unemployed person learns about the distribution of 
wage offers.   
 
It is assumed that the unemployed person will maximise his/her income and use interest rate 
(r) to discount future income. The unemployed person can choose his/her reservation wage 
and search intensity depending on the alternative income and the probability of receiving a 
suitable wage offer. The optimum reservation wage is chosen at a level where the expected 
return from another period of search (unemployment) equals the expected cost of the search.  
 
The expected cost of the search is the wage otherwise received  ) (
R
i W  minus income while 
being unemployed. Unemployed persons usually have some income from unemployment 
benefit. In general, unemployment benefit could be considered to determine the level of the 
minimum reservation wage. Unemployment benefit might be a flat rate (the same for 
everyone) or depend upon the previous wage level, thereby directly influencing the level of 
the reservation wage. Unemployment benefit usually changes with the duration of the 
unemployment spell – when the person is not eligible anymore for the unemployment benefit 
it can be assumed that the reservation wage would decrease sharply. The unemployed person 
might also have other income sources instead of unemployment benefit. In the following all 
income for the unemployed person is described by (Bi). 
 
If the job search were without cost the unemployed person would accept the first job paying 
more than his/her alternative income from benefit. But if he/she cannot continue the job 
search after having accepted an offer and the job search is costly, then the person may be 





The expected return from another period of search equals the probability of getting a job that 
pays more than the reservation wage ( ) ) (
R
i i W W p > , times the discounted value of the extra 
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Equating the expected return from the search with its cost to arrive at a reservation wage 
gives: 






i W W W E W W p
r
B W > ⋅ > + = .       (1.1) 
The higher the alternative income (unemployment benefit), the higher the reservation wage. 
The greater the probability of receiving a suitable job offer and the higher the expected 
offered wage, the higher the reservation wage. 
 
If there is the probability s that a job will end: 
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+ = .     (1.2) 
The higher the probability that a job will end soon, the lower the reservation wage. People 
who look for short-term/seasonal work are willing to accept lower wages. In general, the 
higher the discount rate r and the probability s that the job will end, the lower the reservation 
wage. 
 
2. The Model 
 
The model is intended to determine the reservation wage and the effect of the reservation 
wage on unemployment duration.  
 
It can be assumed that both unemployment duration and the reservation wage are 
simultaneously determined, and there could be a two-way causation between the reservation 
wage and unemployment duration. Longer unemployment periods may lead people to 
decrease their reservation wage while at the same time reservation wages can also effect the 
duration of unemployment spells. There are several arguments why the reservation wage 
might be unemployment duration dependent and decline with the duration of the 
unemployment spell, for example:  
 
  a declining number of job offers as the employer takes the duration of the 
unemployment spell as a negative sign about the human capital and qualifications of 
the unemployed; 
  the unemployed person learns about wage offer distribution; 
  the search becomes limited due to the decreasing income of the unemployed (duration 
of benefit).  
 
As most of the long-term unemployment spells from our sample are excluded, it can be 
assumed that the reservation wage is constant during the unemployment spells under 
consideration. Still, to estimate the effect of the reservation wage on unemployment duration 




As an instrumental variable, we are looking for one which directly affects the reservation 
wage, but which does not affect the job-offer arrival rate or the wage offer distribution. One 
possible instrument would be the level of unemployment benefit as it describes the cost of 
unemployment. This is the instrument used by Jones (1988) and Gorter and Gorter (1993). In 
the dataset used in this paper there is no information about the level of benefit for all of the 
unemployed throughout the entire unemployment spell, although there is information about 
the unemployed individual’s eligibility for benefit. Unfortunately, eligibility for benefit as a 
measure is likely to affect the search intensity. The other possibility is to follow Lancaster 
and use the number of dependants as an instrument (Lancaster, 1985). Consequently, a third 
approach, and the one used in this paper, follows the study by Heath and Swann (1999). As 
the dataset contains information about the household income and the number of household 
members during the unemployment period, the household income per household member is 
used as a determinant of reservation wage, as it should not influence offer arrival rates and, 
therefore, directly influence unemployment duration.  
 
The explanatory variables 
The other explanatory variables used in the reservation wage and unemployment duration 
modelling are mostly dummy-variables to describe education, profession, previous work 
experience, the sector worked in, and the region
1. There are personal characteristics such as 
age, sex and nationality, as well as whether the person receives unemployment benefit or 
social assistance or not. There are also dummy-variables for the years when the person found 
a job or the observation was censored to account for changes in the labour market.  As a base 
group in the study, unemployed Estonian men aged 25–49 with vocational or secondary 
education living in southern Estonia, with work experience in the industrial sector, who do 
not receive unemployment benefit or social assistance were chosen.   
 
The reservation wage equation 
First, the reservation wage equation is estimated. As the data about reservation wages is 
mainly in a discrete form, the effect of explanatory variables on the reservation wage is 
estimated using the interval estimation technique developed by Tobin (1958). The following 
equation is estimated: 
i i i X y ε β + = ' * ,             ( 2 . 1 )  
where  y* – the unobserved reservation wage in the interval ( ) j j y y , , 1 − ; 
 X –vector of explanatory variables; 
  β–vector of coefficients; 
 i,j  – indicate the indices of the observation and interval; 
) , 0 ( ~
2 σ ε N . 
 
The equation is estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation technique. The log-
likelihood function maximised is in the following form: 
                                                 
1 In the current study dummies are used to control for the regional differences of labour demand, instead of 
the regional unemployment rate. Based on the observation that during the time period labour demand was 
decreasing and the unemployment rate was rising in all the regions, regional dummies should be able to 
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,         (2.2) 
where  Φ is the standard cumulative normal distribution function, N is the number of 
observations,  M  is the number of intervals, and  1 = ij d  if  j i j y y y ≤ < − * 1  and  0 = ij d  
otherwise. 
 
The unemployment duration equation  
To model the duration of the  unemployment period the hazard model is estimated. The 
hazard rate describes the conditional probability of leaving the state of being unemployed 
within the following short time period on the condition that the individual is then still 
unemployed. The effect of several exogenous variables on this hazard is estimated.  
 
In this paper the Cox proportional hazard model is used, where the hazard of leaving the state 
of being unemployed is described in the following form
2:  
) ' exp( ) ( ) ( 0 i i x t h t h β ⋅ =   ,        (2.3) 
where  h0 (t)   –  baseline hazard, which in the current paper remains unspecified; 
  β  –  vector of parameters; 
  x  –  vector of explanatory variables. 
 
The hazard model is estimated using the maximum likelihood method. Both censored and 
uncensored observations contribute to the likelihood function being maximised. The spell is 
considered censored when the person leaves the labour force as well as when the person is 
still unemployed by the time of the interview week. The hazard function (2.3) is possible to 
rewrite in the following form, which enables the elimination of the baseline hazard function 
from the likelihood function and an estimation of the effect of explanatory variables on the 
hazard rate without specifying the baseline hazard function. When the observations are 
ordered by the duration of the spell, the probability that the individual i, with an uncensored 
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where Ri – the number of observations under risk, including observations (both censored and 
uncensored), which lasted at least until the period ti.  
 
















) ' exp( log ' log β β ,       (2.5) 
where K – number of observations which end when leaving the state of being unemployed. 
                                                 
2 For the extensive treatment of hazard models see Lancaster (1990).   
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3. The Data 
 
The data is drawn from the Estonian Labour Force Surveys of 1998, 1999 and 2000. These 
are retrospective labour force surveys conducted in the second quarter of each year starting 
from 1998 and then quarterly surveys in the third and fourth quarter of the year 2000. The 
surveys cover the period from 1997 to the end of 2000.   
 
The datasets have direct information about the reservation wage of those individuals who did 
not have a job and were looking for one. The individuals, that reported their reservation 
wage, were asked the following question: ‘How high would your (bruto) salary per month 
have to be for you to take the offered position?’ The question had the following eight 
possible answers: 
 
1.  At least 500 EEK per month; 
2.  At least 1000 EEK per month; 
3.  At least 2000 EEK per month; 
4.  At least 3000 EEK per month; 
5.  At least 4000 EEK per month; 
6.  At least 5000 EEK per month; 
7.  At least 10000 EEK per month; 
8.  More than 10000 EEK per month. 
 
In the dataset there is no information about the hourly reservation wage, so that those persons 
who were looking for a part-time position or started to work in a part-time position are 
excluded from the sample.  
 
The reservation wage and minimum wage in Estonia 
The relevance of reservation wages determining unemployment can be measured in terms of 
their relation to the minimum wage, which sets legally permissible minimum to the wage 
level. There is evidence from many countries that reservation wages are too low, compared 
with minimum wages, to influence unemployment. If minimum wages are high compared 
with reservation wages then possible changes in the reservation wage are less likely to affect 
unemployment. This is because due to the high minimum wage a large share of job seekers is 
excluded from the labour market. If reservation wages are lower than the legal minimum, 
unemployment could be partly reduced by decreasing the minimum wage.  
 
In Estonia the minimum wage as a percentage of the average wage has been increasing since 
the second half of the 90s, which indicates the increasing importance of the minimum wage 
and the possible decrease in the relevance of reservation wages as a determinant of 
unemployment. In Table 3.1 the percentage of unemployed persons surveyed who reported 
their reservation wages to be lower than the official minimum is given for the years starting 
from 1998, when for the first time the official minimum wage was higher than 1000 EEK. 
Due to the structure of the question asked in the labour force survey, information about the 
reservation wage reported from 1997 and 1998 is not comparable in terms of its relation to 
the minimum wage as the minimum wage in 1997 was 845 EEK. Additionally, concerning 
the reservation wage we only know the share of unemployed who were willing to accept a  
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job with a wage of at least 500 and at least 1000 kroons, respectively. Between 1998 and 
2001, the legal minimum wage has been increased from 1100 to 1600 kroons. Also, due to 
the nature of the data in the Labour Force Survey, it is difficult to make a conclusion about 
whether the importance of the minimum wage in determining unemployment and the 
relevance of reservation wages has been increasing or not.  
 











Legal minimum wage  1100  1250  1400  1600   
Minimum wage /average wage  26.7  28.3  28.5  29.0   
% of the unemployed persons surveyed with  
reservation wages lower than the official  
minimum wage 
12.7 10.3  6.6  3.5  29.7* 
Sources: Estonian Labour Force Surveys 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. 
Notes: * Percentage of people reporting their reservation wages to be equal to or less than 
2000, which is lower than the legal minimum wage in the case that the minimum wage had 
been 41% of the average wage in 2001 (then the minimum wage would have been 2259 
EEK). 
 
Looking at the Table it can be seen that the overall share of people, who report their 
reservation wage to be only 1000 EEK, is decreasing from 12.7% in 1998 to 3.5% in 2001. 
However, by the year 2001 the minimum wage was 1600 kroons and the survey only gives 
information about the share of people whose reservation wage is more than 1000 and more 
than 2000 kroons, respectively. To look at the relevance of reservation wages considering 
that the importance of minimum wages should be rising in Estonia, and if assuming that the 
minimum wage would be 41% of the average wage in the year 2001 (as it should be by the 
year 2008), or at least higher than 2000 EEK, then 29.7% of the unemployed would have 
reservation wages lower than the legal minimum. 
 
Sample description 
In the following modelling process the persons who became unemployed at some point 
during the survey observation time are included in the sample. This enables us to combine 
different datasets from the Estonian Labour Force surveys. Each individual enters the sample 
when a person becomes unemployed. There is a negative side to this sampling scheme as it 
leads to a situation where the current long-term unemployed are excluded from the sample.  
 
The datasets have direct data about the reservation wage in the case of individuals who did 
not have a job and were looking for one during the week of the interview. If the person found 
a job by the interview week, information about his/her reservation wage can only be obtained 
by observing his/her wage level in the new job. The observations are excluded from the 
sample where there is no information about the individual’s reservation wage (his/her 




Table 3.2. Description of the data 
 Mean 
Reservation wage  3589 
Unemployment duration in months (spells ending with  
finding a job)  4.804 
Reservation wage determinant   
Income per household member  1062 
Search incentives   
Social assistance / unemployment benefit  0.462 
Work experience   
No previous work experience  0.200 
Agriculture 0.092 
Services 0.360 
Elementary occupations  0.146 
Legislators, senior officials, professionals, technicians,  




Local environment   
Northern Estonia  0.223 
Central Estonia  0.174 
North-eastern Estonia  0.155 
Western Estonia  0.130 
Personal characteristics   
Non-Estonian 0.317 
Age 15–24  0.172 
Age 50–74  0.222 
Female 0.452 
 
Description of the data is presented in Table 3.2. There are six different categories of data, 
which influence the duration of the unemployment period or the reservation wage 
(description of the variables is presented in the Appendix): 
 
  The determinant of the reservation wage – household’s income per household 
member; 
  Search incentives – eligibility for social assistance or unemployment benefit; 
  Work experience data – the sector of the previous job (three different sectors), 
previous occupation (three groups of occupations); 
  Education – the level of education (three different levels); 
  Local environment of the labour market – the region (five regions); 







4. The Results 
 
4.1. The Determinants of Reservation Wages 
 
First, the estimates for the reservation wage are obtained. The main interest is to estimate 
whether unemployment benefit or social assistance influence the reservation wage, thereby 
increasing the minimum wage the person is willing to accept. Surprisingly, the benefit has no 
significant effect on the reservation wage. Furthermore, the reservation wage seems to be 
lower when a person receives some form of assistance. Eligibility for benefit should indicate 
a higher ‘outside option’ for the unemployed. But according to the estimates, when the 
unemployed is eligible for benefit then, probably due to unobserved factors, his/her 
reservation wage is not higher. It should be noted that the result is not uncommon in other 
similar estimations (for example, Heath and Swann for the Australian economy). 
 
As expected, the reservation wage is affected by the factor describing the unemployed 
person’s income. The higher the household’s income per household member the higher the 
minimum wage a person is willing to accept. 
 
Factors affecting the reservation wage that describe a person’s qualifications are things such 
as the person’s previous job, qualifications and level of education. Unemployed individuals 
whose previous job was in agriculture have lower reservation wages compared with those 
from industrial sector. While people whose previous work experience was in the service 
sector do not have significantly higher reservation wages compared with those with work 
experience in the industrial sector.  
 
Those unemployed whose previous jobs involved working as legislators, senior officials, 
professionals, technicians, associate professionals and clerks have higher reservation wages 
compared with service workers, skilled agricultural and fishery workers, craft and related 
trade workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers (these forming the base group). 
While people who worked in elementary occupations have lower reservation wages 
compared with this base group. Educational level is also a statistically significant factor in 
determining the level of reservation wages. People with only a basic education (nine grades) 





Table 4.1.  Determinants of reservation wages (dependent variable: log. reservation 
wages) 
 mean  se 
Instrument    
Log. income per household member   0.035**  0.016 
Search incentives     
Social assistance/unemployment benefit  -0.018  0.023 
Work experience     
No previous work experience  -0.132***  0.037 
Agriculture -0.086**  0.042 
Services -0.021  0.026 
Elementary occupations   -0.109***  0.031 
Legislators, senior officials, professionals, technicians, 
associate professionals and clerks  0.097***  0.033 
Education    
ISCED<3 -0.125***  0.027 
ISCED>4 0.112***  0.038 
Local environment     
Northern Estonia  0.226***  0.035 
Central Estonia  -0.033  0.032 
North-eastern Estonia  -0.132***  0.039 
Western Estonia  -0.035  0.033 
Personal characteristics     
Non-Estonian -0.062**  0.032 
Age 15–24  -0.016  0.029 
Age 50–74  -0.174***  0.029 
Female -0.288***  0.024 
Years    
1997 -0.154***  0.049 
1999 0.089***  0.026 
2000 0.154***  0.029 
Const 7.908  0.108 
Log-likelihood  -2776.129  
No of observations  1805   
Sources: Labour Force Survey, own calculations. 
Notes  Standard errors are given in the last column. * Denotes 10 per cent significance level; 
** denotes 5 per cent significance level; *** denotes 1 per cent significance level. 
 
Individuals who live in the area around the capital, Tallinn, have higher reservation wages, 
while people in the north-eastern part of Estonia have statistically lower reservation wages 
than other areas. People living in the central and western part of Estonia do not have 
statistically lower reservation wages compared with southern Estonia. Looking at the general 
wage data from local areas, it can be seen that wages are almost 50% higher in the capital 
compared to other regions. While the wage level in north-eastern Estonia is not much lower 
compared with other counties. The reason for the significantly lower reservation wages in 
north-eastern Estonia could be the extremely low labour demand in the region. The labour  
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market in the north-eastern part of Estonia can be described as being dominated by a few 
large enterprises and decreasing sectors of the economy. Considering the low geographical 
labour mobility and industry specific skills of the individuals, this leads to bad labour market 
conditions which lower the wage demanded by unemployed. 
 
Personal characteristics, like age and especially sex, are important determinants of 
reservation wages. It is interesting to note that older people from the age group starting from 
50 years and older have significantly lower reservation wages compared with the 25–49 age 
group. It could be that if a person becomes unemployed at 50 then he or she may be willing 
to start to work for a lower wage compared to the younger workers from fear of the effect of 
the bad signal an unemployment period at this age might give to the employer.  
 
One of the most important determinants of reservation wages is sex. Female unemployed 
have much lower reservation wages compared to male. The result is not surprising when 
looking at the wage data in Estonia, according to which the average wage of a male worker in 
the period 1997–2000 was 30 to 40 per cent higher than for female workers. By and large, 
the wage area has not changed much in the second half of the nineties while the wage area 
has been increasing in some professions, such as clerks, and decreasing in others, such as 
some skilled work groups.  
 
Non-Estonians have lower reservation wages compared to Estonians according to the 
estimations. This result may reflect the effect of language barriers. While it could also be 
explained if one looks at the qualifications held by non-Estonian unemployed which tend to 
be exclusively from decreasing sectors of the economy. 
 
4.2. The Influence of the Reservation Wage on Unemployment Duration 
 
The hazard of leaving unemployment is modelled using predicted reservation wages as well 
as personal and labour market characteristics, which determine the offer arrival rate. Offer 
arrival rate is determined by search intensity as well as the general situation in the labour 
market and the person’s qualifications. 
 
The results from the estimation show that the predicted reservation wage influences 
unemployment duration. The estimated coefficient of the predicted reservation wage in the 
regression is negative as expected. The result supports our hypothesis from the beginning of 
the paper that higher reservation wages in Estonia lead to longer unemployment periods. Still 
there was no evidence that unemployment benefit and social assistance increase reservation 
wages. 
 
While unemployment benefit and social assistance were not statistically significant factors 
determining the level of reservation wages, they have statistically significant influence on the 
hazard of leaving unemployment. Which leads to the conclusion that unemployment benefit 
and social assistance reduce the arrival rate of job offers. This has two possible explanations. 
First, people who receive social assistance/unemployment benefit might be less attractive for 
employers due to unobserved factors, so that eligibility for benefit is actually a proxy-
variable for the lower qualifications. The second explanation is that the unemployed  
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receiving social assistance search for job offers less actively. The second explanation 
indicates that social assistance/unemployment benefit give the unemployed some incentive to 
become/stay unemployed. The result has been shown before by Kuddo et al (2002). It is 
interesting to note that according to the current analysis, social assistance/unemployment 
benefit do not influence the level of reservation wage but rather have effect on the job offer 
arrival rate and presumably on the job search intensity. Based on theoretical research on the 
effects of social benefit (see, for example, Nickell and Layard, 1999) it should be concluded 
that there is a need for active labour market measures in the Estonian labour market as well 
as stricter eligibility requirements for unemployment benefit. 
 
Table 4.2.  Determinants of unemployment duration (dependent variable: hazard of 
finding a job) 
 Mean  se 
Log reservation wage  
(predicted value)  -3.047*  1.718 
Search incentives     
Social assistance/unemployment benefit  -0.807***  0.103 
Work experience     
No previous work experience  -0.107  0.256 
Agriculture -0.380  0.236 
Services 0.073  0.123 
Elementary occupations   -0.442*  0.232 
Legislators, senior officials, professionals, technicians, 
associate professionals and, clerks  0.248  0.219 
Education    
ISCED<3 -0.715***  0.252 
ISCED>4 0.576***  0.228 
Local environment    
Northern Estonia  1.071***  0.417 
Central Estonia  0.135  0.126 
North-eastern Estonia  -0.409  0.259 
Western Estonia  0.062  0.143 
Personal characteristics     
Non-Estonian -0.482***  0.153 
Age 15–24  -0.187*  0.113 
Age 50–74  -0.374  0.300 
Female -0.855*  0.494 
Years    
1997 0.748***  0.262 
1999 -0.026  0.186 
2000 -0.803***  0.327 
Log-likelihood -3500.186   
No of observations  1805   
Sources: Labour Force Survey, own calculations. 
Notes: Standard errors are given in the last column. * Denotes 10 per cent significance level; 
** denotes 5 per cent significance level; *** denotes 1 per cent significance level.  
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Among the factors describing a person’s previous work experience, the sector is not a 
statistically significant determinant of the duration of unemployment. While it can be said 
that individuals who have been occupied at elementary occupations have longer 
unemployment periods. Education is also an important factor in determining the length of the 
unemployment period. Unemployed with a basic education have significantly lower 
probability of finding a job compared to the base group and people with higher education 
have a much higher probability of finding a job. 
 
Regional labour market characteristics influence the hazard of leaving unemployment. In the 
northern part of Estonia people are faced with a higher hazard of leaving unemployment. 
Other regions are not statistically different. It is interesting to note that people in the north-
eastern part of Estonia do not have a statistically lower probability of finding a job. This can 
partly be explained by the significant negative effect of non-Estonian nationality. Non-
Estonians have lower probability in finding a job. It is interesting to note that they also have 
lower reservation wages.  
 
Younger people, according to the estimations, have a lower probability of finding a job. The 
result is surprising, although unemployment among younger people is higher. Still, younger 
people are usually observed to have shorter unemployment periods. The unusual phenomena 
in Estonia might be explained by the economic downturn in Estonia, which made it more 
difficult for young people to enter the labour market. Age has no statistically significant 
effect on the probability of finding a job in the case of the older age group (50–74), which is 
probably due to the movement to inactivity in the case of this group of people. 
 
According to the estimations, women have a lower probability of finding a job. This result is 
the usual observation in other countries, while the general labour market trends in Estonia 
have shown a higher share of long-term unemployment among male workers, which has been 
reasoned by looking at the observation that women tend to move into inactivity when losing 
a job. So the estimated lower probability might be partly due to a decrease in these 
movements into inactive status in the case of female workers. The result might also be 
explained by sector-specific factors, the fact that economic downturn cyclically decreased a 
number of jobs in sectors where the share of male workers is higher (for example, building 
and some sectors of manufacturing), while the decrease in female employment was more 
persistent.  
 
As the coefficients of the yearly dummies indicate, the probability of finding a job decreased 
throughout the period. In the year 1997 the probability of leaving unemployment was 
significantly higher compared with 1998 and in the year 2000 it was significantly lower 









The paper investigated the effect of reservation wages on unemployment duration and the 
determinants of reservation wages, as well as estimated the influence of unemployment 
benefit and social assistance on the reservation wage. No statistically significant effect of 
unemployment benefit and social assistance on the reservation wage was found in Estonia. 
The evidence was found that the higher the reservation wage, the lower the probability of 
finding a job, if other things are equal. It was also found that eligibility for unemployment 
benefit/social assistance increases the duration of the unemployment period. This indicates a 
lower offer arrival rate in the case of unemployed receiving assistance, which might be 
caused by lower search intensity.  
 
It can be concluded that unemployment benefit/social assistance gives people in Estonia 
some incentive to become/stay unemployed. It does indicate the need for the stricter 
eligibility requirements for benefit and social assistance.  
 
According to the estimations, the higher the unemployed individual’s income per household 
member, the higher the reservation wage. Factors that indicate the qualifications of the 
worker, such as previous work experience and education are important determinants of the 
reservation wage. Individuals with no previous work experience have a lower reservation 
wage. Unemployed individuals who have previous work experience in agriculture or 
elementary occupations also have lower reservation wages. Unemployed individuals have 
higher reservation wages in Northern Estonia – in the capital, Tallinn – while the 
unemployed from Ida-Viru County have lower reservation wages compared with other 
regions. The personal characteristics of the unemployed are also important determinants of 
their reservation wage. Women have much lower reservation wages compared to men. Also 
non-Estonians have lower reservation wages compared to Estonians and older people from 
the age group over 50 have lower reservation wages compared to the age –group of 25–49.  
 
According to the estimations, besides the reservation wage and factors determining search 
incentives, the other determinants of unemployment duration are again education and work 
experience. The higher the educational level of an unemployed person, the higher the 
probability of them finding a job. The sector in which a person’s previous job was held is not 
a significant determinant of unemployment duration, but if a person worked in an elementary 
occupation he or she would have a lower probability of finding a job. People living in 
Northern Estonia have a higher probability of finding a job compared to the unemployed 
from other regions. Personal characteristics such as nationality, age and sex are important 
determinants of unemployment duration: non-Estonians, younger individuals and female 













Eamets, R. (2002), ‘Eesti tööturu paindlikkus Euroopa Liiduga liitumise kontekstis’, X 
Teadus- ja koolituskonverentsi ettekanded-artiklid. Euroopa Liiduga liitumise mõju 
Eesti majanduspoliitikale, 27.–29.06.2002, Berlin-Tallinn, pp 54–64. 
 
Eamets, R., Philips, K. and Annus, T. (2000), ‘Eesti tööturg ja tööpoliitika’, Tartu: TÜ 
Kirjastus, p 192.  
 
Freytag, A. (2002), ‘Estonian Labour Market and EMU Membership – Challenges and Policy 
Options’, Working Papers of Eesti Pank No 11, Tallinn. 
 
Gorter, D. and Gorter, C. (1993), ‘The Relation between Unemployment Benefits, the 
Reservation Wage and Search Theory’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol 55, Is 2, pp 199–214. 
 
Heath, A. and Swann, T. (1999), ‘Reservation Wages and the Duration of Unemployment’, 
Research Discussion Paper 1999-02, Economic Research Department, Reserve 
Bank of Australia, Sydney. 
 
Jones, S.R.G. (1988), ‘The Relationship Between Unemployment Spells and Reservation 
Wages as a Test of Search Theory’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
November. 
 
Kuddo, A., Leetmaa, R., Leppik, L., Luuk, M. and Võrk, A. (2002), ‘Sotsiaaltoetuste 
efektiivsus ja mõju tööjõupakkumisele’, Poliitikauuringute keskus PRAXIS. 
 
Layard, R., Nickell, S. and Jackman, R. (1991), ‘Unemployment: Macroeconomic 
Performance and the Labour Market’, Oxford University Press, p 618. 
 
Lancaster, T. (1985), ‘Simultaneous Equation Models in Applied Search Theory’, Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol 28, Is 2, pp 113–126. 
 
Lancaster, T. (1990), ‘The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data’, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, p 352. 
 
Nickell, S. and Layard, R. (1999), ‘Labour Market Institutions and Economic Performance’, 
Handbook of Labour Economics, Vol 3C, pp 3029–3084. 
 
Tobin, J. (1958), ‘Estimation of Relationships for Limited Dependant Variables’, 
Econometrica, Vol 26, pp 24–36. 
 
Venesaar, U., Marksoo, Ü. and Maldre, R. (2001), ‘Outflow from Employment and the 
Resulting Social Exclusion of the Vulnerable Groups’, in Ü. Ennuste, Lisa Wilder 
(eds) Factors of Convergence: A Collection for the Analysis of Estonian Socio-
Economic and Institutional Evolution, Tallinn, pp 153–190.  
 
18
Appendix. Description of the variables 
 
Duration of unemployment  –  Measured as the number of months in unemployment  
up to finding a job or to the interview month. 
Log. reservation wage  –  A logarithm of the person’s reservation wage. In the  
case of censored observations, when a person is still 
unemployed during the time of the interview the dataset  
includes information about his/her reported reservation wage.
In case a person has found a job by the time of the interview  
the new wage is used to describe his reservation wage. Data  
about reservation wages is in the interval form. The intervals 
are given in the second section of the paper. 
Log. income  –  A logarithm of the income per household member.  
The income of the household is divided by the number of 
household members. 
The following variables take the value 1 when the characteristic is present, and 0 otherwise: 
Social assistance/benefit  –  The eligibility for social assistance or unemployment benefit.
No previous work experience      
Agriculture  –  Previous work experience in agriculture, hunting and forestry,
fishing. 
Service  –  Previous work experience in wholesale and retail trade,  
hotels and restaurants, transport, financial intermediation,  
real estate, public administration, social security, education, 
health and social work, other service activities.  
Elementary occupations  –  Previous work experience in elementary occupations. 
Legislators, senior officials, 
professionals, technicians, 
associate professionals and 
clerks 
–  Previous work experience as legislators, senior officials, 
professionals, technicians, associate professionals and clerks.
<3    Educational level equal to basic education or less. 
>4    Educational level equal to higher education. 
Northern Estonia  –  Living in Harju County. 
Central Estonia  –  Living in Järva, Lääne-Viru or Rapla County. 
North-eastern Estonia  –  Living in Ida-Viru County. 
Western Estonia  –  Living in Hiiu, Lääne, Pärnu or Saare County. 
Non-Estonian  –  Non-Estonian according to the survey. 
Age 15–24  –  In the age group 1524. 
Age 5074  –  In the age group 50–74. 
Female    
1997  –  The unemployed found a job or the unemployment spell was 
censored in the sample in 1997. 
1999  –  The unemployed found a job or the unemployment spell was 
censored in the sample in 1999. 
2000  –  The unemployed found a job or the unemployment spell was 
censored in the sample in 2000. 
 